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The large inflow of asylum-seekers in recent years has heralded a diversification in
adopted asylum policies across European societies. Although a growing body of research
has addressed these versatile approaches and their implications for the European
integration project, insight into the social basis of these restrictive or open asylum policies
remains underdeveloped. Hence, the current study provides detailed insight into public
preferences for asylum policies and offers a new understanding of how these attitudes
are affected by diverging socio-economic realities across Europe. In addition, this paper
considers the role of individual factors that coincide with publicly adopted frames in
contemporary asylum debates. In particular, to explain how contextual differences reflect
on opinion climates, the impacts of the policy, economic, and migratory context are
studied. On the individual-level, we focus on threat perception and human values,
which represent humanitarian, economic, and cultural frames. To explore these relations,
data on 20 countries from the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016) are analyzed
through a multilevel structural equation modeling approach. Results indicate that, on
the contextual-level, only unemployment rates have a significant impact and, rather
surprisingly, lower unemployment rates provoke amore negative opinion climate. Yet, this
relationship seems to be largely driven by some specific countries that are characterized
by large unemployment rates and relatively positive opinion climates simultaneously. The
migratory and policy context, on the other hand, do not influence attitudes toward asylum
policy. This indicates that it is not necessarily the countries facing the largest inflow of
asylum-seekers or issuing the most positive decisions on asylum applications that have
the most restrictive opinion climates. As shown by the important roles of human values
and threat perceptions, which represent widely adopted frames, public discourses seem
much more important in explaining attitudes toward asylum policy across Europe.
Keywords: attitudes toward asylum policy, economic context, policy context, migratory context, threat
perceptions, human values, multilevel structural equation modeling
INTRODUCTION
The increased inflow of asylum seekers over the last years instigated fierce debates among European
policy makers about the appropriate way to handle this new “crisis” (Hercowitz-Amir et al.,
2017). As member states failed to agree on which rules to implement, a joint European reaction
remained absent and the limits of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) became apparent
Van Hootegem et al. Attitudes Toward Asylum Policy
(Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Some countries, such as Germany,
advocated for relocation schemes and a pragmatic response.
Yet others, including the Visegrád countries, opposed the
introduction of quota and the idea of burden-sharing (Castells,
2018; Glorius, 2018; Zaun, 2018). This lack of effective
cooperation and the inability to develop harmonized asylum
policies have intensified cleavages between states that pursue
more restrictive policies, and nations that are more open and
welcoming toward newcomers (Bakker et al., 2016; Castells, 2018;
Zaun, 2018).
These opposing political reactions coincide with two broader
conflicting perspectives on the desired design of asylum
policies and the approach in handling the renewed inflow of
asylum seekers (Triandafyllidou, 2018). On the one hand, the
humanitarian perspective emphasizes the importance of open
policies, a welcoming and solidary culture, and compassion
with refugees and asylum seekers (De Cleen et al., 2017;
Triandafyllidou, 2018). On the other hand, the exclusionary
perspective advocates for the restricted admission of asylum
seekers and understands the inflow of asylum seekers as an
European crisis that is above all damaging to the well-being of
the native population (De Cleen et al., 2017). This perspective
has mainly been advocated by populist radical right parties
across Europe.
While there is growing scholarly attention for these deepening
political cleavages and their implications for the European
integration project (Zaun, 2018), there is far less insight into
whether this context has also instigated polarization between
European populations in terms of attitudes toward humanitarian
vs. exclusionary asylum policies. In the light of the current
political divides, the question remains how arguments used
on either side of the humanitarian-exclusionary spectrum are
echoed in public opinion. Understanding popular attitudes
toward asylum policy is crucial to grasp the dynamics of policy-
making as well as the intergroup climates wherein asylum seekers
have to be embedded. To remedy this knowledge gap, this
study uncovers the preferences of European citizens for asylum
policies that are aimed at either curbing the inflow or giving
access to larger numbers of asylum seekers. While we recognize
that asylum policies are multi-dimensional (Gest et al., 2014),
we focus specifically on the opposition between openness and
restrictiveness to understand how current policy debates in
Europe resonate among the public at large.
Although previous research (Coenders et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten,
2005) has shown that a majority of the public does not oppose
allowing refugees to stay in a given country, the current political
context warrants deeper understanding of European citizens’
attitudes toward asylum policies. The current situation differs
profoundly in terms of the inflow rate of asylum seekers as
well as in the cultural background of the majority of applicants
compared to the previous peak in asylum applications that
Europe faced in the aftermath of the Kosovo War (Heisbourg,
2015; OECD, 2015). However, our study does not only examine
attitudes in this context but also tries to understand how
contextual divisions between countries (for example in terms
of economic situation and political context) reflect on public
opinion. Particularly, we zoom in on the impact of structural
factors that drive decisions on asylum policies and are regularly
referred to in public debates.
In sum, our contribution aims to uncover how attitudes
toward asylum policy take shape within the current social-
economic context and how they are dependent of the various
national contexts across Europe. In line with previous studies
(Coenders et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Steele and Abdelaaty,
2018; Bolt and Wetsteijn, 2018; Heizmann and Ziller, 2019), we
pay attention to individual as well as country-level determinants
of attitudes toward asylum policies. We investigate the impact of
cross-national differences in the policy, economic and migration
context as well as individual-level mechanisms (basic human
values and threat perceptions) that shape attitudes toward
asylum policy. The individual-level factors are chosen so that
each of them coincides with frames or arguments adopted
in contemporary discussions on the asylum issue and, as a
result, enable to comprehend the underlying mechanisms of the
country-level effects. To study the impact of the individual and
contextual determinants, we analyze data from the European
Social Survey Round 8 (2016) by means of multilevel structural
equation modeling (MSEM; Meuleman, 2019).
INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
ASYLUM POLICY: THE ROLES OF ETHNIC
THREAT AND HUMAN VALUES
Although attitudes toward various categories of migrants can
empirically be strongly related and might partly stem from
the same antecedents (Meuleman and Billiet, 2003; Meeusen
et al., 2018), we study opinions regarding policies targeting
asylum seekers separately. After all, the public can experience
distinct forms of threat by various migrant groups (Meuleman
et al., 2018) and differentiate in their attitudes toward them
(Bansak et al., 2016; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017). These
findings legitimize a separate analysis of attitudes toward asylum
policies, especially in times of intensified debates on issues
related to asylum seekers and refugees (e.g., relocation schemes,
asylum centers, tenability of the Dublin regulation, . . . ). Yet, to
shed light on the (dis)similarity of policy preferences regarding
asylum and migration in general, we also explicitly compare
both attitudes.
Before turning to the discussion of the contextual factors that
create dividing lines between countries—that is, the main focus
of this paper—, we first discuss the impact of the individual-level
mechanisms that underpin the formation of attitudes toward
asylum policy. In particular, we focus on perceptions of economic
and cultural threat as well as on the basic human values of
universalism and conformity-tradition. Not only are each of
these included factors important in shaping sentiments toward
immigrants (McLaren, 2003; Davidov et al., 2014), they also
relate closely to the main arguments or frames present in public
discourses on asylum policies. On the one hand, certain frames
stress a solidary or moral responsibility to take care of asylum
seekers and refugees who are the main victims of the “crisis”
(Triandafyllidou, 2018). This type of humanitarian discourse
stresses the importance of aiding asylum seekers and installing
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a “Willkommenskultur” (De Cleen et al., 2017; Ritter and
Rhomberg, 2017). On the other hand, threat frames aremobilized
that represent the inflow of immigrants as disastrous for the
well-being of the host population (Triandafyllidou, 2018). These
arguments highlight the economic, cultural, and securitarian
impact of admitting asylum seekers, as they focus on the costs for
the economy, the potential erosion of dominant cultural values,
and the endangerment of the safety of the native population,
respectively (De Cleen et al., 2017; Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017).
In absence of contextual data capturing the salience of the
different discourses, this paper investigates whether individuals’
endorsement of core messages of the various frames is related to
policy preferences. Thus, instead of investigating how discourses
influence attitudes toward asylum policy on the macro-level,
we examine how opposition vs. support for generous policies
crystallizes around attitudinal axes that relate to the frames—
i.e., humanitarianism and (cultural, economic, or security) threat.
When endorsement of particular frames is strongly predictive
of attitudes toward asylum policy, we see this as an indication
that the respective frame plays an important role in the public
debate.Moreover, the proposed predictors are chosen so that they
contribute to the understanding of how contextual differences
reflect on public opinion. The investigated frames often refer
to contextual factors (such as the economic situation and the
number of asylum applications; cf. De Cleen et al., 2017;
Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017) and the mechanisms behind these
individual predictors are generalizable to the macro-level (cf.
McLaren, 2003). Although we focus on the relationships between
these variables and attitudes toward asylum policy and hence only
formulate hypotheses about opinions on asylum, we investigate
also whether these predictors operate similarly for attitudes
toward immigration policy in general.
Group conflict theory (GCT) posits that negative attitudes of
majority group members toward outgroups could be perceived
as a reaction to ethnic competition over scarce resources
(Coser, 1956; Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1983; Quillian,
1995). Previous studies found that perceived ethnic threat
indeed leads to negative attitudes toward asylum seekers and
preferences for restrictive asylum policies (Coenders et al.,
2004; Bolt and Wetsteijn, 2018; Steele and Abdelaaty, 2018).
Yet, these studies have not taken into account the distinction
between competition over material resources (i.e., housing
and welfare) and conflict over symbolic goods (i.e., norms,
values, and identities; Meuleman et al., 2009). While the first
source of competition sets of feelings of economic threat,
the latter instigates cultural threat perceptions. Differentiating
between both forms of threat is not only important because
they refer to distinct ways of framing the inflow of asylum
seekers (De Cleen et al., 2017; Greussing and Boomgaarden,
2017; Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017), but also because they
differ in their antecedents (e.g., the impact of economic
indicators) as well as consequences (e.g., voting behavior;
Sniderman et al., 2004; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2011; Harell et al.,
2012; Meuleman et al., 2017).
To begin with, individuals might feel economically threatened
by the inflow of asylum seekers, as their presence is often
portrayed as strengthening competition over scarce material
resources (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2016). This
fear coincides with an often-heard discourse that portrays asylum
seekers as disguised economic migrants that seek to profit
materially from the European welfare state (De Cleen et al.,
2017; Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017). The economic frame builds
on socio-tropic concerns about the financial impact of asylum
seekers and sees them as a threat to the prosperity and welfare
of the host country (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Ritter
and Rhomberg, 2017). In addition, concerns that asylum seekers
or immigrants with diverging normative views endanger national
identity, such as the native language, religious practices, and
dominant traditions, gives rise to cultural threat (Ivarsflaten,
2005; Schlueter et al., 2013). This cultural threat frame is
frequently embedded in an rhetoric that identifies asylum seekers
from Muslim countries as a source of “Islamization,” and defines
Islam as being incompatible with “Western civilization” and its
core liberal values, such as secularism and equality between men
and women (Bracke, 2012; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran, 2017;
De Cleen et al., 2017; Lucassen, 2018). Both forms of threat are
embedded in negative discourses that stimulate the restriction of
the admission of asylum seekers to limit economic competition
and to preserve cultural traditions (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Hence, we
expect that economic (Hypothesis 1) as well as cultural threat
(Hypothesis 2) will lead to more support for restrictive asylum
policies, although the strength of both effects might differ.
Yet according to GCT as well, economic and cultural threat
perceptions are not distributed evenly across the population, but
are socially stratified. In particular, especially low-status groups,
such as lower educated and low-income individuals, are prone
to feel economically and culturally threatened and to support
restrictive policies, as they often compete more over the same
material resources (Schneider, 2008) and have more limited
cultural capital, which makes them less likely to value diversity
and cultural differences (Manevska and Achterberg, 2013).
Economic and cultural threat thus function as mediating factors
in the relation between socio-economic status and attitudes
toward asylum policy.
However, this GCT-based model exclusively focuses on ethnic
competition and disregards the important role of basic human
values. Previous research has evidenced how values, as trans-
situational goals, are powerful factors shaping specific attitudes
and evaluations of the social world (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995;
Davidov et al., 2008, 2014). The values are included not
only because they are closely connected to publicly adopted
frames on the cost and benefits of admitting asylum seekers
(Tartakovsky andWalsh, 2016), but also because they correspond
to norms indentifying appropriate behaviors and reactions to
immigration-related dilemma’s (cf. Ziller et al., 2019). In the case
of intergroup attitudes, especially the values universalism and
conformity-tradition are relevant. First, universalism emphasizes
tolerance and the defense of the welfare of all human beings
(Schwartz, 1994, p. 22). This value resonates within the
humanitarian resettlement discourse that stresses the moral
duty to protect needy asylum seekers (Schwartz, 2006; Davidov
et al., 2014; Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2016; Ritter and Rhomberg,
2017). This discourse was prominent in the beginning of the
“crisis” and conflicts with the primordial nationalistic frame
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model with hypotheses.
that completely restricts the inclusion of newcomers (Roccas
et al., 2010). Second, the value conformity-tradition refers to a
commitment both to the compliance with social expectations
and to the preservation of traditional culture (Schwartz, 1994,
p. 22). This value coincides with a frame that portrays asylum
seekers as disruptive for social order and threatening to social
cohesion (Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2016). This logic is further
reflected in political debates when the core liberal values of so-
called Western civilization are protected to preserve national
integrity (Lucassen, 2018). While universalism is expected to
stimulate support for open asylum policies (Hypothesis 3), the
internalization of conformity-tradition is anticipated to foster
restrictive attitudes (Hypothesis 4).
Simultaneously, universalism should lower perceived ethnic
threat and conformity-tradition should increase cultural and
economic fears (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995; Davidov et al.,
2014). We also expect that these values are socially stratified,
as high-status individuals are more prone to internalize
universalism and less likely to rely on conformity and
tradition (Schwartz, 2007; Meuleman et al., 2013). Our
theoretical model is thus a partial serial mediation, where
the social structural characteristics influences human values
that in turn impact threat perceptions, which eventually shape
attitudes toward asylum policy. The conceptual model with
the various hypotheses is visualized in Figure 1. We also
estimate direct effects of the social structural variables on
threat perceptions and attitudes toward asylum policy, but have
omitted these from the graphical representation to keep the
figure clear.
Apart from our central variables of interest, we include
additional variables that have been evidenced to impact attitudes
toward immigration and asylum. In line with previous research,
we expect more religious individuals to be more accepting
of immigrants and asylum seekers (Lubbers et al., 2006;
Bohman and Hjerm, 2014; Davidov et al., 2014). Although
religious individuals might be more conservative, they seem
simultaneously more inclined to be willing to aid others
generally and asylum seekers specifically (Lubbers et al., 2006).
To control—at least partially—for regional differences within
countries, we also include the impact of living in an urbanized
or a rural region. While ethnic competition might be larger in
cities, there is at the same time more potential for intergroup
contact, which might foster more open attitudes (Schneider,
2008). As a last predictor, we focus on the role of perceptions of
unsafety in one’s neighborhood. Individuals who feel unsafe in
their neighborhood and attribute this to immigrants or asylum
seekers can develop more negative attitudes (Rustenbach, 2010).
CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD ASYLUM POLICY
Although previous studies have tried to unravel contextual effects
on support for open vs. restrictive asylum policies across Europe
(Coenders et al., 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2005), these studies were
mainly conducted in light of the previous asylum “crisis” in the
early 2000s. Yet, the current situation is profoundly different.
During the aftermath of the Kosovo War in the early 2000s,
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migration movements were relatively gradual, intra-European
and believed to be mostly temporary. The current peak of
asylum applications conversely includes more rapid, large and
long-term extra-European migration flows (Heisbourg, 2015).
Moreover, countries now deal with applications from a wider
variety of countries of origin, which increases the duration
of application processing and, consequently, pressures asylum
systems (OECD, 2015, p. 7). This new context has widened
the gap between the opposing political perspectives on the
asylum “crisis” as well as between different European states
(Castells, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2018; Zaun, 2018). The varying
national circumstances across Europe raise concerns that civil
society is becoming equally polarized in camps contra and
pro the introduction of open asylum policies. To date, we do
not know how exactly the diverging national contexts affect
European citizens’ attitudes toward asylum policy and whether
they complicate a common European response to the renewed
inflow of asylum seekers.
In studying how contextual factors relate to asylum policy
preferences, we focus on determinants that are of particular
importance in current policy debates and oppositions within
Europe. Arguments related to structural barriers such as the
number of asylum seekers already taken in, the difficulty of
integrating various ethnic groups or the economic burden this
poses, have been especially prevalent in discussions on the intake
of asylum seekers and refugees (e.g., Funk, 2016; Bucken-Knapp,
2017; De Cleen et al., 2017). Moreover, we aim to uncover
whether the unique and relatively new context has deteriorated
public opinion toward states’ policies on asylum and migration.
While we recognize that many other indicators pertaining to the
general social climate, such as political and media discourses,
could be highly influential, this study is restricted to the analysis
of the impact of some objective country-level indicators of the
policy, economic and migratory context as a necessary first step
in the understanding of attitudes toward asylum policy.
As an indicator of policy context, we examine whether the
actual generosity of asylum policies is related to the preferred
openness vs. restrictiveness of asylum policies. In this regard,
we use the rate of positive decisions on asylum applications
in a given country (i.e., recognition rate). This indicator is
relevant because, in contrast to other more generic policy
indicators (e.g., Migration Integration Policy Index scores), it
is an indicator of the actual pursued asylum policy rather than
of more general integration or immigration approaches. The
recognition rate is closely connected to the composition of
asylum applicants in terms of countries of origin, as countries
receiving many applicants from clear conflict regions (e.g., Syria
or Afghanistan) should be more likely to take positive decisions.
We nevertheless partly control for the differentiation in profiles
of asylum seekers between countries (see further). Moreover,
even if applicants from the same country of origin are compared,
there are vast differences between European member states
in the proportion of applications they recognize (Berger and
Heinemann, 2016). These differences in recognition rates could
be related to public opinion in various ways. On the one hand,
higher recognition rates could lead to more open attitudes, as
they point to a governmental endorsement of the admittance
of asylum seekers, which in turn stimulates more welcoming
attitudes (Esses et al., 2017). Policies may have a norm-shaping
function by institutionalizing norms on the ways to treat asylum
seekers and on the desired role of migrants in society (Schlueter
et al., 2013). On the other hand, higher recognition rates may
also intensify concerns about larger numbers of asylum seekers
settling in the country, which might instigate threat perceptions
and restrictive preferences. Previous studies suggest that open
immigration policies are linked to lower rather than stronger
threat perceptions and that the norm-shaping function is most
plausible (Schlueter et al., 2013; Green et al., 2019). Consequently,
we hypothesize that higher recognition rates will lead to higher
support for open policies (Hypothesis 5).
The financial and economic crisis have furthered the relevance
of economic arguments to legitimize the restriction of rights
of asylum seekers (Trauner, 2016). Moreover, economic factors,
such as GDP and unemployment rates, constitute an important
dimension in the design of initial relocation schemes meant to
fairly distribute asylum seekers over member states (Niemann
and Zaun, 2018). As economic conditions also influence the
intensity of ethnic competition and the degree of solidarity
citizens are willing to show (van Oorschot, 2008; Meuleman
et al., 2017), they are expected to be relevant not only to
explain divergence in the intake of asylum seekers but also to
interpret differences in attitudes. We focus specifically on long-
term unemployment rates to study how the economic context
and scarcity of jobs in the aftermath of the financial crisis of
2008 impact asylum policy preferences. To nevertheless also take
into account that changes in unemployment rates rather than
absolute levels might impact opinions (Meuleman et al., 2017),
we include the impact of the rise in unemployment over 10
years as a robustness check (seeTable A4 in appendix). Following
group conflict theory, attitudes should be especially restrictive
in a situation of high unemployment, as this reinforces labor
market competition (Scheepers et al., 2002; Meuleman et al.,
2017). Furthermore, higher unemployment rates might instigate
concerns about the financial implications of accommodating and
integrating asylum seekers, thus stimulating preferences for more
restrictive asylum policies (Hypothesis 6).
As we expect that the number of asylum seekers and the
countries of applicants’ origin can reflect differently on the
attitudes toward asylum policy, two dimensions of the migratory
context are taken into consideration. Disentangling these two
dimensions offers a more precise understanding of how the so-
called “asylum crisis” and arguments uttered in policy debates on
the numbers and types of asylum seekers coming in reflect on
public opinions. First, the number of asylum applicants in 2016 is
included, as a larger number of asylum applications in a country
(that is, outgroup size) may increase the saliency of migration
issues and the actual competition over material and cultural
resources. Considering the number of asylum applications over
2015 and 2016 together might be also relevant. For that reason,
the relationship with the average number of applicants over
both years is also tested (see Table A4 in appendix). According
to GCT, competition induces threat perceptions and negative
attitudes toward asylum seekers (Scheepers et al., 2002; Zaun,
2018). However, simultaneously a larger outgroup size increases
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the probability of intergroup contact, which promotes more
open attitudes (Schneider, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).
Contact may nevertheless be relatively limited with asylum
applicants, as they are often retained in centers that allow
relatively limited contact with majority populations. The number
of asylum seekers coming in might thus stimulate public
reactions of threat more than intergroup contact. Hence, we
expect higher support for restrictive policies in countries facing
higher levels of asylum applications (Hypothesis 7). To also
include the impact of the size of outgroups in broader terms and
to contrast the threat with the contact hypothesis, we test the
impact of the percentage of the foreign-born population from
outside the EU as a robustness check (see Table A4 in appendix).
Second, asylum seekers from Middle Eastern conflict regions
are mostly seen as the “real refugees” and are considered to
be more deserving than, for instance, African refugees (Holmes
and Castañeda, 2016). As these asylum seekers are considered
more deserving of help, higher shares of applications from these
regions might strengthen the credibility of the humanitarian
frame and stimulate empathy with asylum seekers and their
search for protection. The higher the percentage of asylum
applications from these regions, the higher the support for open
policies is expected to be (Hypothesis 8).
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
Data
We use data of 2016 from the European Social Survey
(ESS) round 8 for the analyses (dataset version 2.0;
doi: 10.21338/NSD-ESS8-2016) that includes multiple measures
of attitudes toward asylum policy. The ESS consists of
probability-based samples of the resident population of over 15
years of age that are interviewed bymeans of face-to-face surveys.
Attitudes toward asylum policy are investigated in 20 European
countries, namely: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (see Table A1 in
appendix for sample sizes and descriptive statistics). Originally
23 countries participated in the eighth round of the ESS, but
Hungary, Israel and Russia are not included in the analysis.
While this is related to the exclusion of one of the items on
asylum policy in the questionnaire of Hungary, Russia and Israel
are omitted because they do not constitute European countries.
Foreign-born respondents, individuals who are not a citizen of
the given country and individuals who indicate that they are part
of a minority group are excluded from the analysis, as attitudes
of the majority group are investigated. The total sample is equal
to 32,705. To understand attitudes toward asylum policy in
light of the current context, data of ESS round 1 collected in the
aftermath of the previous “asylum crisis” (2002/2003) are also
used as a point of comparison.
Indicators
Dependent Variable
Attitudes toward asylum policy are measured by two items on a
5-point scale (agree strongly-disagree strongly). The items refer
to the extent to which the government should be generous in
judging asylum applications (gvrfgap) and to whether refugees
should be allowed to bring family members (rfgbfml). There is
also a third item (rfgfrpc) in the ESS, which probes whether
or not respondents believe that refugee applicants are in real
fear of persecution in their country of origin. Because the item
loads relatively poorly on the shared latent variable and refers to
more general attitudes toward asylum seekers instead of asylum
policies, it is, however, omitted from the analyses. The inclusion
of only two items is of course not optimal, as it decreases
the degrees of freedom and complicates the evaluation of the
fit of the measurement model. As the same items are used to
operationalize the latent concept on the individual- and the
country-level, a two-level confirmatory factor analysis is applied
to assess to validity of the concept on the within—as well as on
the between-level. Factor loadings are set equal across levels to
guarantee that the construct can be interpreted similarly at the
individual—and country-level (Tay et al., 2014; Ruelens et al.,
2018). The factor analysis shows that factor loadings, which are
displayed in Table A2 in appendix together with the question
wordings, are sufficiently large on both levels. Higher scores on
the latent variable indicate more support for restrictive policies.
Immigration policy preferences are also included as a dependent
variable in appendix to check the differences with asylum policy
preferences. This is operationalized through three four-point
items asking to what extent immigration should be allowed or
restricted (imsmetn, imdfetn, and impcntr).
Individual Independent Variables
Economic (imbgeco) as well as cultural threat (imueclt) are each
measured by one item that assesses whether respondents believe
that immigrants are good or bad for the economy and cultural
life, respectively (11-point scale). Both items are reversed so
that higher scores indicate higher levels of ethnic threat. The
human values are measured by means of the shortened version
of the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz et al., 2001)
included in the ESS. Respondents are asked to what extent they
identify with given hypothetical portraits of people (6-point
answer scale). For the unified value conformity-tradition the
four portraits encompass: showing modesty (ipmodst), attaching
importance to tradition (imptrad), behaving properly (ipbhprp),
and doing what you are told (ipfrule). The three items of
universalism measure the importance of: listening to different
people (ipudrst), treating everyone equally (ipeqopt) and caring
for nature and the environment (impenv). The items are all
reversed so that higher scores indicate higher identification with
the two human values. The validity of the two constructs is
assessed by means of confirmatory factor analysis (see Table A3
in appendix for more details). All factor loadings are sufficiently
large and, after implementing two theoretically justified error
correlations, the fit of the model is adequate according to most
criteria (X2 = 1310.374; df = 11; CFI = 0.945; RMSEA =
0.060; SRMR = 0.036). The TLI (0.896) is on the low side,
but modification indices show that the model does not contain
substantial local misfit.
As indicators of socio-economic status, we use occupation,
education as well as subjective income. Occupation is divided
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by the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero scheme (Ganzeboom
and Treiman, 1996) into six classes: the service class, white
collar workers, blue collar workers (reference category), the self-
employed, the unemployed, and the retired and other non-
actives. Dividing occupation into EGP-based classes allows to
offer more detailed insight into how various groups view asylum
policies and goes further than generic and one-dimensional
measurements of social status. Educational attainment (edulvlb)
is measured through ISCED classification, which is used to
create three categories: lower (secondary) education, higher
secondary education (reference category), and tertiary education.
To indicate their subjective income (hincfel), which has far less
missing values than objectivemeasures (0.8 vs. 16%), respondents
were offered the following four categories: “living comfortably on
present income,” “coping on present income,” “finding it difficult
on present income,” and “finding it very difficult on present
income.” This categorical variable is also divided into several
dummy variables to provide more insight into whether each of
the categories score differently on support for restrictive asylum
policies. The following variables are also included in the statistical
models: age, gender, religiosity (rlgdgr; 0–10), perceived safety in
one’s neighborhood (aesfdrk; recoded so that 1 = safe, 0 = not
safe) and area of residence (domicil; recoded so that 0 = rural
area, 1= big city, suburbs or town).
Contextual Independent Variables
Four contextual variables are included: the recognition rate
of asylum applications, the long-term unemployment rate,
the number of asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants and
the share of these applications from Syria, Afghanistan and
Iraq. Based on Eurostat data (2016b), the recognition rate of
applications for asylum is calculated by dividing the number of
positive decisions (granting refugee status) by the total number
of decisions taken in a given country. For unemployment rates,
the average long-term unemployment rate over the years of
2011 to 2016 is taken from the World Development Indicators
database of the World Bank (The World Bank, 2016). Taking the
average guarantees that the used unemployment rates represent
a more stable figure. As mentioned, we compare the result of
this long-term unemployment rate to the impact of the change
in unemployment rate between 2006 and 2016 (see Table A4
in appendix). To calculate the number of asylum applications
per 1,000 inhabitants, data from Eurostat on the number of
asylum applications in 2016 as well as on the size of the
native population in 2016 are used (Eurostat, 2016a,c). As a
robustness check, we also check the impact of the number of
asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants averaged over 2015 and
2016. The role of the percentage of the population born outside
the EU is also considered as an alternative operationalization
of the size of the outgroup (Eurostat, 2016c). The share of
applications from Middle Eastern conflict regions is obtained
by dividing the number of applications of individuals from
Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan by the total number of applications
in 2016 (Eurostat, 2016a). We focus on the share of asylum
applications from these countries of origins, as they constituted
some of the most evident conflict regions and encompassed
the largest represented nationalities among applicants in 2016
(UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency, 2017). Applicants from these
countries are, as a result, most likely to be considered credible
candidates for the acquirement of refugee status. The scores on
these contextual variables per country are displayed in Table A1
in appendix.
Statistical Modeling
To estimate all the relationships on the individual- as well as
on the country-level and to take the clustered nature of the
data into account, multilevel structural equation modeling is
applied (Meuleman, 2019). This SEM-based approach has the
advantage to make it possible to model measurement error and
to specify indirect effects. The choice for multilevel analysis is
supported by the fact that no less than 20.7% of the variance of
attitudes toward asylum policy is located at the country level.
The estimated structural model with all included variables and
empirical relationships is visualized in Figure 2. Note that the
individual-level predictors are only included at the within level
(the between-level components are thus omitted). The reason
is that the small sample size at the higher level limits the
complexity of the between-level model that can be estimated. In
order to remediate the effects of the limited number of higher-
level units (20 countries), we use a Bayesian estimator that
improves accuracy of the results (Meuleman and Billiet, 2009;
Hox et al., 2012; Stegmueller, 2013). For the Bayesian estimation
the Gelman-Rubin criterion is used to examine convergence (the
cut-off value is set to 0.01) and two chains of the Gibbs sampler
are requested (Gelman et al., 2004; Hox et al., 2012). The number
of iterations is set to 10,000 to facilitate convergence and a
thinning factor of 50 is used to counter autocorrelation (Muthén,
2010). Trace and autocorrelation plots are also inspected to assess
convergence and the absence of autocorrelation. As Bayesian
estimation provides little information on the fit of the model,
indices are obtained by re-estimating the models with a robust
maximum likelihood estimation procedure.
All analyses are conducted with Mplus version 7.3 (Muthén
and Muthén, 2012). To deal with item non-response, the Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure is used.
Cases with missings are included in the calculation of pairwise
correlations, unless they have missing values on all endogenous
variables or on one of the exogenous variables. This is the
case for 1,109 cases (3.4%), resulting in a final sample size
of 31,596. The syntax for data preparation in SPSS and for the
statistical modeling in Mplus can be found as a Supplementary
File (Data Sheet 1)
RESULTS
Descriptive Overview: Comparing Attitudes
Toward Asylum Policies Between 2002 and
2016
To gain insight in how the contemporary context of the “asylum
crisis” bears on public opinion, we start by comparing attitudes
toward asylum policy between 2002 and 2016 (see Figure 3).
The point of comparison (2002) is the aftermath of the Kosovo
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FIGURE 2 | Model with estimated empirical relationships.
FIGURE 3 | Means (ȳ) and standard deviations (sd) of attitudes toward asylum policy in 2002 and 2016.
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War. Besides country means, we also compare a measure of
dispersions (the standard deviation). This allows us not only to
see whether support for restrictive asylum policies has evolved,
but also to investigate whether an increase in polarization of the
public opinions on asylum policy can be witnessed.
Interestingly, Figure 3 indicates that there is considerable
geographical variation in the support for the restrictiveness of
policies, as means for 2016 range from 2.27 in Spain to 3.50
in the Czech Republic (higher values represent more support
for restrictive policies). Citizens in the Southern and Nordic
countries are generally the most in favor of open asylum
policies, while the strongest support for restrictive policies can be
witnessed in Central- andWest-European countries. Some of the
countries that received the lowest number of applications (e.g.,
Czech Republic and Estonia) are simultaneously characterized
by restrictive opinion climates. This pattern illustrates that the
countries who face the highest number of applications are not
necessarily most restrictive in their attitudes (see Table A1 in
appendix for numbers of asylum applications per country).
Public opinion divides do not necessarily mirror differences in
the intake of asylum seekers across Europe.
The over-time comparison teaches us that attitudes have
become significantly more favorable between 2002 and 2016
in twelve countries (out of the 17 with available data for
both rounds)1. Only in Poland, Italy, Austria and the Czech
Republic have attitudes become significantly more restrictive. As
Poland and the Czech Republic have not faced high numbers of
applications over the recent years, this again illustrates negative
sentiments cannot be traced back to heightened inflows of asylum
seekers. Although attitudes have become more open in most
countries, Figure 3 also shows that the dispersion of opinions
has increased between 2002 and 2016 in many countries. In
nine countries, we see a significant increase of the standard
deviation of attitudes toward asylum policy, while a significant
decrease is only found in one country. The slightly increasing
support for open policies thus coincides with more diversified
attitudes toward asylum policy. This may point to a growing
polarization within countries and a deepening cleavage between
the humanitarian and exclusionary perspectives on asylum.
Although the most restrictive attitudes and an increase in
negative opinions are not to be found in countries facing
the highest numbers of asylum applications, the dividing lines
between countries are not random either. Restrictive attitudes
are especially prevalent in countries where the issue of migration
has been heavily politicized. Countries with an open opinion
climate, such as Portugal and Spain, are characterized by low
migration salience and the absence of strong anti-immigration
parties (Dennison and Geddes, 2019). Countries with higher
and growing support for restrictive policies such as Austria
experienced increasing negative politicizations of the asylum
issue (Gruber, 2017). It is no coincidence that two of the four
countries where attitudes became more restrictive over time
(i.e., Czech Republic and Poland) are part of the Viségrad
states, which have been most vocal in opposing open policies
1A set of independent sample t-tests and a number of Levene’s tests were conducted
to determine whether means and variances are equal across samples.
and the introduction of a common quota system (Zaun, 2018).
Consequently, rather than mirroring divides in numbers of
asylum applicants between European countries, attitudes toward
asylum policy seem susceptible to the politicization of the
asylum issue.
Individual and Contextual Determinants of
Attitudes Toward Asylum Policy
To gain more insight into the individual and contextual
characteristics that shape attitudes toward asylum policy,
we estimate a multilevel structural equation model2 (see
visualization in Figure 2). Hereby we focus on the most recent
ESS round of 2016. Table 1 displays standardized regression
coefficients (and 95% posterior probability intervals) obtained
by Bayesian estimation3. The effects are discussed following the
order of the presumed causal chain of the model.
Table 1 shows that, on the individual-level, men, older
respondents, lower-educated individuals, respondents coping
with their present income, more religious individuals, those
from rural areas and who feel unsafe underscore the value
conformity-tradition the most. This might be because these
groups rely more on traditional ties and habitual patterns
(Schwartz, 2007). In contrast, women, older respondents, higher-
educated individuals, individuals living comfortable on their
income, respondents that are not blue-collar workers, those
who are more religious and those that feel safe put greater
emphasis on the value of universalism. The higher scores on
universalism of individuals with a higher socio-economic status
are not surprising, as education stimulates openness and a higher
income facilitates a broader worldview (Schwartz, 2007).
Individuals who emphasize the value of universalism, in
turn, feel economically and especially culturally less threatened.
Universalism includes a transcendence of individual interests
and individuals that stress its importance are, consequently, less
inclined to perceive a clash in interests and to feel threatened
in their well-being (Meuleman and Billiet, 2018). The value
of conformity-tradition conversely stimulates perceptions of
economic and cultural threat, which can be understood from a
2The estimation of the structural model with a robust maximum likelihood
estimator shows that various indices suggest that the fit at the within- and the
between-level is adequate (X2 = 1847.645; df = 128; CFI = 0.919; TLI = 0.854;
RMSEA = 0.021; SRMRW = 0.024; SRMRB = 0.075). CFI and TLI are too low,
which is most likely related to the large number of categorical variables (with a
large number of dummies) in the model. These dummy variables typically produce
large correlation matrices with many near-zero entries. Such correlation structures
typically lead to low incremental fit indices (such as CFI and TLI) because they
are based on a comparison with a baseline independence model. Because the
observed data structure contains a large number of low correlations, this baseline
is not so bad and difficult to improve. The modification indices and the differences
between the estimated and observed correlation matrix do not reveal local misfit
or plausible alterations that are theoretically defendable and would ameliorate the
fit substantially. On the between-level, the elevated SRMR seems to be related to
the restriction of equal loadings across levels and the regression of the predictors
on the latent concept instead of on the items separately. We nevertheless allow
this minor misfit to occur in order to estimate a more parsimonious model that
is defendable.
3Coefficients are interpretable in a similar fashion as for a regression with a
maximum likelihood estimator and the intervals should be interpreted as the 95%
probability that the population value falls between the two bounds.































TABLE 1 | Standardized parameter estimates and posterior probability intervals of a model predicting attitudes toward asylum policy (N = 31,596).
Conformity-tradition Universalism Cultural threat Economic threat Attitudes toward asylum
policy




Male 0.026* [0.013 to 0.040] −0.085* [−0.099 to −0.069] 0.001 [−0.011 to 0.012] −0.054* [−0.065 to −0.043] 0.037* [0.024 to 0.051]
Age 0.172* [0.158 to 0.186] 0.028* [0.013 to 0.044] 0.004 [−0.008 to 0.017] −0.018* [−0.030 to −0.005] 0.018* [0.004 to 0.032]
Education
Lower (secondary) 0.022* [0.008 to 0.038] −0.027* [−0.043 to −0.011] 0.000 [−0.012 to 0.013] 0.029* [0.017 to 0.042] −0.044* [−0.059 to −0.030]
Higher secondary (ref)
Tertiary −0.075* [−0.091 to −0.060] 0.098* [0.082 to 0.114] −0.096* [−0.109 to −0.083] −0.089* [−0.102 to −0.076] −0.009 [−0.024 to 0.006]
Subjective income
Comfortable (ref)
Coping 0.018* [0.003 to 0.033] −0.076* [−0.092 to −0.060] 0.061* [0.048 to 0.073] 0.063* [0.051 to 0.075] −0.024* [−0.038 to −0.011]
Difficult 0.010 [−0.005 to 0.025] −0.065* [−0.081 to −0.048] 0.105* [0.093 to 0.117] 0.114* [0.102 to 0.126] 0.000 [−0.015 to 0.014]
Very difficult −0.001 [−0.015 to 0.014] −0.044* [−0.059 to −0.029] 0.085* [0.074 to 0.097] 0.090* [0.079 to 0.102] 0.027* [0.014 to 0.042]
Occupation
Service −0.001 [−0.017 to 0.014] 0.027* [0.010 to 0.043] −0.028* [−0.041 to −0.016] −0.032* [−0.045 to −0.020] −0.008 [−0.023 to 0.006]
Blue collar (ref)
White collar 0.000 [−0.020 to 0.020] 0.053* [0.032 to 0.073] −0.050* [−0.066 to −0.034] −0.058* [−0.075 to −0.042] −0.004 [−0.023 to 0.014]
Self–employed −0.015 [−0.031 to 0.000] 0.038* [0.021 to 0.055] −0.017* [−0.030 to −0.003] −0.029* [−0.042 to −0.016] 0.012 [−0.002 to 0.027]
Unemployed −0.014 [−0.029 to 0.001] 0.057* [0.040 to 0.073] −0.010 [−0.023 to 0.002] 0.008 [−0.004 to 0.021] −0.014* [−0.028 to 0.000]
Retired/non–active 0.006 [−0.014 to 0.027] 0.086* [0.063 to 0.107] −0.068* [−0.086 to −0.051] −0.072* [−0.089 to −0.055] −0.057* [−0.076 to −0.037]
Religiosity 0.290* [0.276 to 0.304] 0.082* [0.067 to 0.096] −0.098* [−0.110 to −0.085] −0.102* [−0.115 to −0.090] −0.047* [−0.062 to −0.033]
Area of residence
Rural area (ref)
Big city, suburbs or town −0.061* [−0.074 to −0.047] 0.014 [0.000 to 0.028] −0.038* [−0.049 to −0.027] −0.055* [−0.066 to −0.044] −0.011 [−0.024 to 0.001]
Perceived safety
Not safe (ref)
Safe −0.046* [−0.060 to 0.032] 0.063* [0.048 to 0.078] −0.103* [−0.115 to −0.092] −0.089* [−0.100 to −0.078] −0.024* [−0.038 to −0.011]
Conformity–tradition 0.392* [0.372 to 0.413] 0.325* [0.304 to 0.345] 0.168* [0.142 to 0.194]
Universalism −0.412* [−0.431 to −0.393] −0.328* [−0.347 to −0.310] −0.286* [−0.311 to −0.261]
Economic threat 0.272* [0.255 to 0.289]
Cultural threat 0.328* [0.310 to 0.347]
R2 (within) 0.169 0.050 0.261 0.205 0.497
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Number asylum applications 0.001 [−0.444 to 0.444]
% conflict regions −0.171 [−0.703 to 0.412]
% unemployment −0.581* [−0.914 to −0.114]
Recognition rate 0.382 [−0.201 to 0.861]
R2 (between) 0.497
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stronger fear for deviant norms and alternative beliefs (Davidov
et al., 2014). In addition, individuals who have not completed
tertiary education, with a lower subjective income, blue collar
workers, less religious respondents, individuals from rural areas,
and those who feel unsafe perceive stronger economic and
cultural threat. Rather surprisingly, unemployed respondents
do not feel economically more threatened, but this might be
related to the larger fear of becoming unemployed due to
immigration among employed respondents (and especially blue-
collar workers) (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). In addition, results
indicate that the lower educated do not directly feel more
culturally threatened. This might be because the relationship
is mainly indirect (through conformity-tradition) rather than
direct. In general, respondents from deprived backgrounds feel
indirectly, through their higher identification with conformity-
tradition and lower emphasis on universalism, as well as directly
more threatened.
Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, economic and cultural
threat foster support for restrictive asylum policies. The sizes
of the regression coefficients of both economic threat (b =
0.27) and cultural threat (b = 0.33) are quite large, which
points to the importance of socio-tropic concerns about the
economic and cultural impact in shaping attitudes. Those
who adopt negative frames and, as a result, believe migration
damages the economic situation and erodes cultural unity,
advocate for stricter policies in order to protect the welfare and
traditional norms of their group (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Although
economic and cultural threat perceptions thus correspond
to distinct frames on the asylum issue, they have a similar
impact on attitudes toward asylum policy. Apart from the
influence of threat perceptions, the two human values directly
and indirectly influence support for restrictive policies. In line
with hypothesis 3, universalism stimulates the promotion of
open policies, which might be due to its coincidence with a
humanitarian framework that focuses on the needs of asylum
seekers and on helping others more generally (Tartakovsky
and Walsh, 2016; Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017). Conformity-
tradition, in contrast, fuels reluctance to admit asylum seekers.
This lends support to hypothesis 4 and is related to the overlap
of conformity-tradition with discourses that portrays asylum
seekers as damaging to the social cohesion and existing normative
order (Tartakovsky and Walsh, 2016). Together all of these
individual-level variables are able to explain almost half of the
within-variance of attitudes toward asylum policies. Clearly, the
individual-level mechanisms included in the model have high
explanatory power.
On the contextual-level, results indicate that most of our
economic, policy, and migratory indicators are not capable of
explaining cross-national differences in attitudes toward asylum
policy. Although there is considerable variation in recognition
rates between countries—as indicator of the pursued approaches
in handling the increase in asylum applications (Berger and
Heinemann, 2016)—this does not reflect on attitudes toward
asylum policy among the population at large. The standardized
coefficient for recognition rate is relatively large and positive
(b = 0.38), but insignificant. This refutes hypothesis 5. The
two dimensions of the migratory context do not significantly
impact attitudes either. The number of asylum applications in a
given country cannot account for differences in opinion climates
between European states (b = 0.00). While this is in contrast to
hypothesis 7 and common expectations (e.g., Zaun, 2018), the
null effect of the size of the outgroup confirms the observed
patterns in the descriptive overview. The countries that have
taken in most asylum seekers are not necessarily confronted with
a backlash in public opinion. The wide variation in the countries
of origin of the incoming asylum seekers does not seem to matter
for public preferences either: The share of asylum seekers from
Middle Eastern conflict regions is not significantly related to
public attitudes. There is thus no support for hypothesis 8, which
states that higher shares of these groups would stimulate support
for more open policies.
The long-term unemployment rate is the only contextual
indicator that is significantly related to attitudes toward
asylum policy. Contrary to hypothesis 6, the influence of the
unemployment rate is negative rather than positive, which
would mean that stronger support for open asylum policies
is precisely found in contexts with higher unemployment
rates (and thus more adverse economic conditions). However,
when plotting the relationship between average attitudes toward
asylum policy and long-term unemployment rates (see Figure 4),
it becomes evident that the significant regression coefficient
of unemployment rate is mainly attributable to the cases of
Spain and Portugal. Both countries are characterized by high
average support for open policies as well as high unemployment
rates (13.63% in Portugal and 23.07% in Spain), which heavily
impacts the relationship. Several other countries combine
low unemployment rates with restrictive preferences, which
is in line with the direction of the relationship, yet this
pattern does not hold across the whole set of countries under
investigation. In addition, the regression coefficient of the long-
term unemployment rate becomes insignificant when estimating
the same structural model without Spain. This confirms that
the effect is mainly driven by one influential case and that the
significant coefficient of long-term unemployment rates thus
needs to be qualified. In any case, these results disconfirm
the competition hypothesis stating that economic recessions
fuel conflicts over material resources (Scheepers et al., 2002;
Meuleman et al., 2017).
The robustness checks with alternative operationalization
of the migratory and economic context (extra-EU foreign-
born population, the number of asylum applicants averaged
over 2015 and 2015, and the change in unemployment rates
between 2006 and 2016) also indicate that these contexts do not
have an important influence (see Table A4 in appendix). The
results do not change substantially when using these different
indicators, which strengthens our main conclusions. Our paper
demonstrates that strong divides in attitudes toward asylum
policy exist between the European populations under analysis,
but that the contextual indicators do not explain these country-
level differences. Neither the policy context, nor the economic
or migratory context are able to uncover the nature of the
divisions in opinion climates. Some of the factors that have been
suggested as causes of citizens’ opposition against the arrival of
asylum seekers, such as the unemployment rate and the number
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FIGURE 4 | Scatterplot of country means of attitudes toward asylum policy and average unemployment rates between 2011 and 2016.
of asylum seekers entering (Niemann and Zaun, 2018), are not
systematically related to the public opinion climate.
Comparing Attitudes Toward Asylum
Policies and Attitudes Toward Immigrant
Policies
When attitudes toward immigration policy in general are
analyzed instead of attitudes toward asylum policy, we reach
quite similar conclusions, and roughly the same set of predictors
is relevant (see Table A5 in appendix). Similarly to attitudes
toward asylum policy, economic, and cultural threat perceptions
foster support for curbing immigration. The two human values
also have an equivalent impact, with conformity-tradition leading
to more restrictive attitudes and universalism stimulating open
views. Those with a lower socio-economic status are also both
directly and indirectly more opposed to allowing immigrants
entry into the country. In addition, the four contextual predictors
are not significantly related to the public opinion climate,
which also confirms the conclusion that structural factors are
not decisive in shaping the attitudes of the public. There are
nevertheless also some differences with attitudes toward asylum
policy. While for attitudes toward asylum policy the cultural
threat variable has the strongest impact, for immigration policy
preferences perceptions of economic threat are more important.
This indicates that cultural arguments are more relevant in
discussions on asylum and economic discourses more influential
in debates on immigration in general. The stronger impact of
the cultural threat variable might, however, be specific to the
current context, as many incoming asylum applicants have non-
European backgrounds. In addition, the explained variance on
the context-level is much lower for opinions on immigration
policy. These results indicate that although it is theoretically
relevant to distinguish between attitudes toward various migrant
groups, empirically the same structural drivers are at play in
shaping these opinions. This seems to indicate that restrictive
attitudes toward different migrant groups often occur together
and that opinions on specific groups are actually an expression of
a diffuse attitude toward ethnic outgroups in general (Meuleman
and Billiet, 2003).
CONCLUSION
In light of the current context, characterized by increased inflows
of asylum seekers as well as deepening European cleavages in
perspectives on appropriate political responses, this paper set out
to gain deeper insight into majority-group members’ attitudes
toward open vs. restrictive asylum policies within and between
European societies. We realized this by focusing on three aspects:
(1) a descriptive overview of how attitudes toward asylum policy
varied across European countries between 2002 and 2016; (2) an
analysis of the impact of individual-level factors connected to
dominant arguments and frames used in asylum debates, with
a specific focus on threat perceptions and human values; (3) an
examination of how the structural factors referred to in public
debates on asylum explain differences between member states in
opinions on policies, with particular attention for the influence of
the policy, economic and migratory context.
A first finding is that between 2002 and 2016 support for open
policies has become stronger in a majority of countries. Although
the current situation differs profoundly from the context at the
beginning of the century in terms of diversity and pace of the
inflow of asylum seekers (Heisbourg, 2015; OECD, 2015), in
most countries citizens are now more supportive of generous
admission policies than in 2002. Nevertheless, we did find strong
regional variations in attitudes toward asylum policy as well as
growing polarizations within European countries. In line with the
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growing divergence in terms of political responses to the crisis
as well as in discourses being adopted (Ritter and Rhomberg,
2017; Castells, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2018), public opinions on
the European continent tend to become more divided. While
in the Nordic and Southern countries the public seems to favor
open polices that admit larger quantities of asylum seekers,
attitudes in several Western- and Central-European countries
are far more restrictive. The restrictive opinion climates in
countries such as the Czech Republic and Estonia cannot be
understood on the basis of GCT, as these countries received a
negligible share of the total asylum seekers in Europe and the
Czech Republic was one of the countries that did not relocate
any asylum seekers (Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Zaun, 2018).
Countries who faced the largest numbers of asylum applications
are not necessarily the ones where the public opinion climate is
most negative.
On the individual level, discourses appeared to be relevant,
as we found a strong impact of several individual factors
that are closely related to dominant discourses on asylum. In
accordance with frames or discourses that portray refugees as
economically burdensome and as culturally deviant (Greussing
and Boomgaarden, 2017; Ritter and Rhomberg, 2017), economic
and cultural threat perceptions fostered restrictive attitudes.
Socio-tropic concerns about the impact of the inflow of
immigrants on the economy and cultural life appeared to
be of great importance in shaping attitudes. Apart from
threat perceptions, the two human values universalism and
conformity-tradition had a considerable impact. Universalism,
which coincides with a humanitarian frame (Tartakovsky and
Walsh, 2016), led to weaker concerns about the impact of
migration and to more support for open policies. Equivalent
to concerns for the preservation of the Western liberal core
values in political debates (Lucassen, 2018), conformity-tradition
fuelled economic and cultural fears, and opposition to open
migration policies.
Another finding is that our indicators of policy and migratory
context are unable to explain the cross-national attitudinal
differences. Differences in cross-national circumstances that were
given a lot of weight in national and European debates on how
to approach and distribute the rise in asylum applications, such
as the number of asylum seekers and the economic contexts
(Trauner, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018), seem to be not
at all related to the asylum or immigration policies citizens
prefer. Although a significant negative effect of the long-term
unemployment rate was found, this relationship was mainly
driven by the specific positions of Spain and Portugal. Our
results illustrate that contrarily to the GCT-based claim that
adverse economic contexts and larger sizes of the outgroup would
instigate anti-migrant sentiments, the actual competitive and
policy contexts are incapable of predicting country divisions in
attitudes toward asylum policy.
The absence of effects of the migratory and economic
context suggests that other factors might be more relevant
to understand diverging attitudes toward asylum policy across
European countries. Although we did not test this explicitly,
our results suggest that public opinion mirrors dividing lines
in dominant political perspectives and discourses. The rather
restrictive opinion climate of the Central-European countries,
for instance, resembles the strong resistance of policy makers
in these countries (including the Visegrád group) against open
policies and the adoption of quota (Veebel and Markus, 2015;
Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Zaun, 2018). Previous research
has indeed evidenced that media framings and political
discourses may influence anti-immigrant attitudes (Bos et al.,
2016; Matthes and Schmuck, 2017; Czymara, 2019), while
the presence of populist entrepreneurs might also explain
more restrictive attitudes toward immigrants in some countries
(Wirz et al., 2018).
Our contextual analysis contends with several limitations,
however. First, the relatively small number of countries included
in the study complicates the application of multilevel models, and
even the Bayesian estimation procedure cannot prevent that the
tests for context effects have limited power only. The absence of
significant effects should thus be interpreted with the necessary
caution. Second, the included indicators to operationalize these
various contexts are, due to limited data availability, not always
as optimal as we would like them to be. The recognition rate, for
instance, is intertwined with the composition of the backgrounds
of asylum applicants, as higher recognitions might occur in
countries that have higher shares of applicants from evident
conflict regions. In addition, the indicators of the migratory
context only consider the asylum applications in a given year
and, as a result, fail to adopt a dynamic approach (e.g., Meuleman
et al., 2009) as well as to fully grasp the total size and diversity of
the outgroup. To address this shortcoming, we used alternative
operationalizations of the economic and migratory context as
robustness checks, which yielded the same conclusions. This
gives additional evidence that structural factors do not really
seem to strongly determine attitudes toward asylum policies.
As the symbolic discourses being pushed and used as frames
of references seem to reflect much harder on the policies
deemed appropriate by citizens, indicators more closely related
to these popular arguments should thus instead be included.
Future research would benefit from a detailed examination
of how contextual discourses are reflected in public opinions
toward immigrants.
The seemingly higher relevance of political mobilizations and
media discourses in understanding attitudes compared to the
actual cross-national circumstances also has other implications.
The diverging national contexts across EU member states do not
seem to negate the development of a common public response
to the challenges that the increased inflow of asylum seekers
introduces. Contrarily to what is often believed and argued,
the differential national contexts as such do not seem to make
wide public support for a strong common European asylum
system impossible. Instead populist governmental mobilizations
and vast differences in adopted discourses might complicate
wide public support for shared and open solutions across
Europe (Zaun, 2018). As the cases of Hungary and Poland
clearly indicate, aggressive mobilizations and strong anti-
immigrant rhetoric might instigate drastic increases in anti-
migrant sentiments and, as a result, erode the social basis for open
and commonmigration policies (Zaun, 2018; Van Hootegem and
Meuleman, 2019).
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